“Bringing you the names you need to know first, since 2002. It’s what we DO. Buckle up!“ - Draftnick Ric writer on Substack
Welcome to All Access Football!
The National Football League Draft Countdown now stands at 7 days until we reach our destination: Kansas City!
For premium AAF newsletter subscribers, Brian Baldinger and Ric invite you to join them on Friday, April 28th at 6:00 PM EST for Draft Day 2. Join AAF premium and ask Baldy and Ric your draft questions in a private All Access Football Zoom room.
DRAFTMETRICS MORE ON TRADES
A recent Draftmetrics article reviewed situations where teams traded up or down in the draft. In this article, activity in trading players for draft choices will be examined. In contrast to trading draft choices, it is difficult to analyze player trades in any kind of analytical framework. It is interesting, though, to look at recent player trades and outcomes with the benefit of at least a degree of hindsight. Ten major trades are reviewed in the remainder of this article.
In 2020, the Vikings traded Stefan Diggs and a 7th round selection to the Bills in exchange for a first round pick (#22), a 5th round pick (#155), a 6th round pick (#201) and a 4th round pick (#134) in the 2021 draft.
Here’s what the Vikings did with their picks:
The Bills drafted Dane Jackson with their 7th round selection and he became a starter in 2022. Camryn Bynum became a starter for the Vikings in 2022. None of the other three players drafted by the Vikings with the acquired selections did anything noteworthy.
Outcome: Win-win; both sides had to be satisfied with this trade. The Bills and the Vikings each ended up with an exceptional wide receiver and a contributing defensive back.
In 2019, the Jaguars traded Jalen Ramsey to the Rams for a 1st round selection (#19) in 2020, a 1st round pick (#25) in 2021 and a 4th round pick (#121) in 2021.
The Jaguars used their selections to take K’Lavon Chaisson, Travis Etienne and Jordan Smith.
Outcome: Advantage Rams. Ramsey made the Pro Bowl three times. Chaisson has started 11 games over three seasons and has seen his playing time decrease each year. Etienne was a solid addition. Smith played one season.
In 2020, the 49ers traded DeForest Buckner to the Colts for a 1st round pick (#13).
The 49ers traded selection #13 plus a 7th round for a 1st round pick (#14) and a 4th round pick (#117). The 49ers drafted Javon Kinlaw and used the 4th rounder as part of a package to move up and take Brandon Aiyuk in the 1st round.
Outcome: Advantage Colts. Buckner has been a good acquisition, making All Pro one season. Kinlaw has been hampered by injury but has shown promise. Aiyuk has been a solid contributor.
In 2019, Dolphins traded Minkah Fitzpatrick to the Steelers for a 2020 1st round pick (#118) and a 2021 6th round selection (#207).
The Dolphins selected Austin Jackson with the 1st round pick and traded the 6th round selection for a 7th round pick and DeAndre Washington.
Outcome: Advantage Steelers. Fitzpatrick has been a main cog in the Steelers defense. Jackson was a day one starter but was injured in 2022. Washington was of minimal help. Fitzpatrick was public about getting out of Miami, so that may have hampered the Dolphin’s bargaining power.
In 2020, Texans traded DeAndre Hopkins and a 4th round pick (#131) to the Cardinals for David Johnson, a 2nd round pick (#40) and a 2021 4th round pick (#122).
Texans selected Ross Blacklock in the 2nd round and traded the 4th round pick as part of a package for Marcus Cannon. The Cardinals selected Rashard Lawrence with their acquired 4th round selection.
Outcome: Advantage Cardinals. This may have been Bill O’Brien’s defining moment as a general manager. Not a popular trade among Texans fans. Hopkins caught 115 passes for the Cards in his first season but has been hampered by injury since. Lawrence has had injury issues in each of his three seasons. Johnson was okay in 2020 but has not done much since. Blacklock played two seasons and was traded for a 6th round pick. Marcus Cannon played only one season in Houston and started four games.
In 2020, Washington traded Trent Williams to the 49ers for a 2020 5th round pick (#156) and a 2021 3rd round pick (#74).
Washington selected Keith Ismael in 2020 and Benjamin St-Juste in 2021.
Outcome: Advantage 49ers. Williams has been an All Pro performer. Ismael has been mostly a reserve. St-Juste was a starter in 2022.
In 2020, the Jets traded Jamal Adams and a 2022 4th round selection (#109) to the Seahawks for Bradley McDougald, 2021 selections in the 1st (#23), and 3rd round pick (#86) rounds and a 2022 1st round selection (#10).
The Seahawks selected Coby Bryant with their 4th round pick. The Jets packaged the 2021 selections to move up to #13 and select Alijah Vera-Tucker. Garrett Wilson was selected with the 2022 1st round pick.
Outcome: Tough one to call but slight edge to the Jets. Adams has a great first season with the Seahawks, setting a record for sacks by a defensive back but tailed off a bit in 2021 and was injured in 2022. Bryant was a part-time starter in 2022. Vera-Tucker was a day one starter but was injured in 2022. McDougald played half of one season for the Jets. Wilson had 83 catches as a rookie. Wilson could swing the balance in favor of the Jets.
In 2022 the Seahawks traded Russell Wilson and a 4th round pick (#116) to the Broncos for Drew Lock, Shelby Harris, Noah Fant, 2022 selections in the 1st (#9), 2nd (#40) and 5th round (#145) and 2023 selections in the 1st (#5) and 2nd rounds (#37).
The Broncos selected Eyioma Uwazurike with their selection. The Seahawks made the following picks:
Outcome: This trade is looking very lopsided right now in favor the Seahawks. Wilson had a disappointing season. Owazurike played a little. Drew Lock sat behind Geno Smith in 2022 and is now a free agent. Harris, Fant and Cross were all starters for the Seahawks and Mafe saw extensive action. This could be different if Wilson rebounds, but looking terrible for the Broncos at this point and the Seahawks still have two more early selections in the upcoming draft.
In 2022, the Texans traded DeShaun Watson and a 2024 6th round pick to the Browns for 2022 picks in the 1st (#13) and 4th (#107) rounds, 2023 picks in the 1st (#12) and 3rd rounds (#73) and 2024 picks In the 1st and 4th rounds.
Houston traded their 2022 1st round pick for a 1st (#15), 4th (#124) and two 5th round picks (#162 and 166), which they used to take Kenyon Green. The other selections in that draft were packaged with other picks to end up with John Metchie, Christian Harris and Thomas Booker. The 4th round pick was used to select Dameon Pierce. More to come on the 2023 and 2024 selections.
Outcome: Hard to make a definitive call as it depends on how Watson rebounds from his suspension, but the Texans certainly win on the volume of players. Still a lot to come on this trade, both in terms of remaining draft selections and the performance of Watson and the young Seahawk players.
In 2022, The Packers traded Davante Adams to the Raiders for 1st round (#22) and 2nd round (#53) selections.
The Packers selected Quay Walker in the 1st round and traded the #53 pick along with another 2nd round selection to move up to #34 and take Christian Watson.
Outcome: The edge has to go to the Raiders with Adams registering 100 catches in 2022, but the Packers did get good value.
Get ready for the 2023 NFL Draft with positional and big board rankings from the team at The NFL Draft Bible. In-depth prospect rankings with linked reports and all updated player information.
Click on the "DRAFT PROFILE" link to view the scouting report of your favorite 2023 NFL Draft prospect. You can also toggle between positions to view updated rankings.
Big Board | QB | RB | FB | WR | TE | OT | OG | OC | DT | EDGE | LB | CB
Draftmetrics - Part I
A Historical Study of the NFL Draft Spring 2022
INTRODUCTION My fascination (my word)/obsession (my wife’s word) with the NFL draft began in 1969 when my beloved Steelers drafted Joe Greene. I had always been a big NFL fan. Fresh out of college, the draft became a huge interest of mine. At that time, the draft was a weekday event with no live television coverage. The draft was not televised until 1980.
In order to keep track of the draft selections, my mother, armed with a list of names I gave her, was tasked with the job of tuning in to periodic draft day updates on local radio and calling me with the updates. What a mother will do for her son! I continued to be a fan of draft. Mock drafts projections were hard to come by back in those days. How times have changed! My primary source of information was articles written for Pro Football Weekly by Carl and Pete Marasco.
Coincidentally, they started writing those articles in 1969. I also devoured the pro football annuals like Street & Smith and began developing lists from which I would make first-round predictions for the amusement of my friends. The Marasco brothers eventually moved on to jobs in the NFL and they were replaced in my universe by Joel Buchsbaum who started his draft writings around 1974.
Buchsbaum was a recluse whose life revolved around the draft. Mel Kiper joined the draft party in the late 70s, starting out by sending his own draft rankings to NFL front offices. Mel is, of course, now a household name in the draft community. My draft interest took a drastic turn in 1987, sparked by a conversation I heard on a local sports talk show. I am also highly interested in college football recruiting. This conversation centered around the talk show host’s disinterest in college football recruiting. His rationale was that it was difficult to predict how successful a recruit will be, so why follow it?
This set off a light bulb in my head. Just how predictable was the NFL draft? This drew my interest away from following prospective draftees toward analyzing career outcomes. Being a numbers nerd whose idea of a good time is to enter numbers into spreadsheets, this was right up my alley.
My interest resulted in publishing two studies that were purchased by a number of NFL teams:
• “The NFL Draft: A Historical Perspective” published in the fall of 1987 and updated in January 1989
• “Draftmetrics: A Study of the NFL Draft from 1990-2009” published in the Spring of 2010.
I also wrote columns regarding this aspect of the draft for the “National Football Post” from 2013 to 2015 The studies were largely based on a database I developed based on information from a variety of sources from which I captured the number of games started by drafted players.
As the prevalence of situational substitutions grew, it became increasingly apparent to me that the number of starts was not really an effective evaluation metric. For example, a team may start a game in a three-tight end set and the third tight end never sees another snap in that game.
Scrimmage play participation can be a much better, though still imperfect, metric. I had set aside my analysis after 2010 as snap count information was not readily available. In 2012, though, the NFL began publishing weekly “Gamebooks” that contained snap count information. I began using those weekly sheets to extract the snap counts, but for this study, all snap counts are as reported by pro-footballreference.com. This provided verifiable information for the construction of a database for all players drafted between 2012 and 2021.
This study uses the database to examine various aspects of the draft. This allows me to satisfy my neverending thirst for information about draft outcomes and provide that information to others with a similar interest in the draft. This study will: • Put the draft into proper perspective
• Examine the outcome of drafts from 2012 through 2019
• Evaluate the draft performance of NFL teams and selected colleges
• Review difference among draft years
• Comment on constructing a competitive NFL roster Feedback and constructive criticisms are always welcomed. I am always interested in improving this analysis. If you have any suggestions, please email them to me at draftmetrics@gmail.com.
PUTTING THE DRAFT IN CONTEXT
There are only two ways to enter the National Football League. Either a player is drafted (through the regular draft, or the seldom-used supplemental draft) or he is signed as an undrafted free agent It goes without saying that the draft is the most important player source for the NFL.
The following table uses scrimmage snap counts from the 2021 regular season to quantify that importance. For each NFL team, the table shows the percentage of snaps from 1) self-drafted players, 2) players drafted by other teams acquired through trade, waiver or free agency, 3) a subtotal for all drafted players, and 4) undrafted free agents (UDFAs). Team SelfDrafted Players Other Drafted Players All Drafted Players UDFAs Team SelfDrafted Players Other Drafted Players All Drafted Players UD
• 83% of the snap counts are attributable to players who have been drafted
• There is significant player movement once a drafted player enters the league, a topic that will be discussed later in this study
• UDFAs accounted for over 17% of scrimmage snaps
o The Lions (30%), Chargers (29%), Patriots (27%) and Saints (25%) had the highest participation by UDFAs with the Saints having 11 UDFAs logging over 200 scrimmage snaps
o The Giants, on the other hand, had only one UDFA with 200 or more scrimmage snaps.
DRAFT OUTCOMES
This analysis was done for the purpose of understanding and communicating reasonable expectations for players selected at every stage of the draft. While every selection is made with high expectations, history can tell us how a selection is likely to pan out. History, of course, is not an absolute predictor of future performance. History did not predict the success of Tom Brady. Who would have expected his career from a sixth-round selection? As will discussed later, though, an average of two players from the sixth round of each draft do move on to become Significant Contributors (defined later) in the NFL.
This analysis is based on scrimmage snap counts and years of longevity. This is a quantitative analysis. It is not qualitative. Everyone’s snaps count the same, whether it is Aaron Rodgers or Drew Lock. While this is somewhat of a shortcoming with this approach, time spent on the field is a reasonable measure of the success of a draft selection and it has the advantage of being a measurable outcome.
The only subjectivity in the player evaluations are the projections regarding the arc of a player’s career for more recent draft selections. Take Saquon Barkley who was drafted in 2019 for example. Will he return to pre-injury form and be a dominant running back or are his days as a feature back over? Those are the type of judgments made, especially for players drafted in 2018 and 2019. I tend to error on the side of optimism in those assessments.
This analysis is one way to evaluate draft outcomes but not the only way. I am always looking to improve my process but this seems like a reasonable approach.
The Evaluation Process
The first step in the process is to eliminate, for analysis purposes, draftees from 2020 and 2021 from the database, leaving eight years of data. It is too soon to evaluate the success of those draftees as it is too early in their careers. Then, special teams players (kickers, punters and long snappers) were eliminated as they don’t participate in scrimmage plays and this analysis is based on scrimmage snaps. This leaves 1999 players who were drafted between 2012 and 2019.
The next step is to evaluate each of the 1999 players. Two considerations should be noted up front:
• The reasons for a shortened career do not matter in this analysis. Players are not given a pass for injuries, off-field issues, or early retirements. The reasons for a career being shortened do not matter. That is all part of career “mortality”.
• Seasons, where a player participated on special teams but not from scrimmage, are counted as a season played.
Based on snap counts and length of career, players are placed into one of seven categories.
1. Those who never play a down in the NFL. Standing on the sidelines does not count. If a player does not see the field, he gets no credit.
2. Those who play one season in the NFL.
3. Those who play only two seasons in the NFL.
4. Those players who played at least three seasons but did not participate in at least 20% of a team’s snaps in any of at least three seasons. These players are generally those who are kept on the roster because of their special team’s ability or who are buried deep in the depth chart and only sporadically see the field for scrimmage plays.
5. Players who played three or more seasons and participated in 20% to 39% of the team’s snaps in at least three seasons. This represents participation in 13-25 snaps per game. These players are referred to as Contributors, abbreviated as C.
6. Players who played three or more seasons and played between 40% and 59% of the team’s snaps in at least three seasons. This represents participation in 25-38 snaps per game. These players are referred to as Significant Contributors in this study, abbreviated as SC.
7. Players who played at least three seasons and played at least 60% of the team’s snaps in at least three seasons. This represents participation in at least 38 snaps per game. These players are referred to as Major Contributors, abbreviated as MC.
One important element is the use of the three-year “window” in the categorization of a career. It is admittedly arbitrary, but it is viewed as a minimum requirement for a draft choice to be deemed successful. evaluated. A case could certainly be made for extending that window, but three years seems to be reasonable.
The draft is divided into 14 segments for purpose of this analysis:
These segments are, again, somewhat arbitrary but seem appropriate. Breaking the first round into four components is an attempt to find the lines where success begins to diminish. It would be possible to have more segments (i.e., after the first round, divide each round into four segments rather than two), but these segments seem to be the best balance in terms of the appropriate level of detail.
Analysis Results
This table shows the historical probability of outcomes at each stage of the draft based on the draft classes from 2012-2019 and using ten years of data.
Let’s put this into perspective. The average NFL team will have between seven and eight selections in a draft. There are seven rounds, but the addition of compensation selections drives the number of players selected to about 250, or nearly eight per team. The results of an average eight-man draft class, excluding special teams players, will look like this:
Some observations regarding draft outcomes:
• Draft positions one through 20 had similar outcomes
• Players drafted in those draft slots had an 80% chance of becoming Major Contributors
• There was a considerable drop-off past the 20th draft slot among Significant and Major Contributors.
• Players drafted in the first half of the second round had about the same chance of success as later first-round (draft slots 21 and later) selections
• “Trading down” from the end of the first round to the first half of the second round appears to be a great opportunity, as the outcomes are largely the same and any consideration received is a bonus.
There was a modest decline in outcomes between the first and second halves of the second round.
• Thereafter there is a regular decline in outcomes, excepting the first half of the fifth round, which actually had better outcomes in terms of Major Contributors than the fourth round.
o There is no apparent reason for this statistical aberration but such players as George Kittle and Stefon Diggs were selected there
• Beginning with the third round, there was no more than one chance in three that a player will become a Major Contributor
• Over 90% of players drafted participated in at least one NFL game.
• 26% of the players drafted became Major Contributors, representing 60+ players per draft class. A couple of side notes:
• Justin Blackmon was the only selection in the top 5 picks to only play two seasons. A selection by the Jaguars in the 5th slot of the 2012 draft, he violated the NFL substance abuse policy on more than one occasion and was never reinstated.
• Senquez Golston, selected by the Steelers at #56 in the second round in 2015 was the earliest drafted player in the study period never to see the field. His career was ended by injury after spending two years on injured reserve.
Topics covered in this newsletter.
Copyright © 2022 Anthony J Villiotti, 63 Stancey Road, Pittsburgh, PA 15220
This publication, or any part thereof, may not be reproduced or transmitted in any form or by any means, electronic or mechanical, or by photocopying, recording, storage in an information retrieval system of otherwise, without the prior written consent of Anthony J. Villiotti